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ARGUMENT
I.

THERE IS NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY, THEREFORE THE ISSUES RAISED
BY PETITIONER ARE MOOT AND THIS CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

In its Brief in Opposition to Respondent's Cross-Appeal, the
Petitioner attempts to sidestep the mootness issue by framing a
controversy

based on factual allegations that were not in the

Petitioner7s original Petition below and do not appear anywhere in
the record.

Petitioner argues that its claim is not moot since an

actual controversy exists.

Petitioner maintains that Al Bench

"abused his discretion" in his conclusions reached based on the
November 1, 1991 flow test; that Table III-B of the Uniform Fire Code
gives the Petitioner "the right to have three or more fire hydrants
to protect its building"; that Petitioner, in fact, installed four
fire hydrants; that four hydrants equally spaced around the building
give more protection than three hydrants; and, that Petitioner spent
a considerable amount of money for hydrant No. 3 and 200 feet of
supply line, and therefore, "an actual controversy between the
parties" exists.

(See Petitioner's Brief, p. 7.)

reasoning is, in short, non

The Petitioner's

sequitur.

Aside from its logical infirmity, Petitioner's argument is
fundamentally wrong and procedurally flawed. The Respondent's Motion
to Dismiss below was based on the language in the Petition and
brought pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

In

considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as
true the allegations

in the Plaintiff's

Complaint

and has to

determine whether or not a legally cognizable claim lies against the
named

Defendant

c:\ugt\westsute\appeal.rcp
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inferences drawn therefrom.
(Utah App. 1996).

See, Baker v. Angus,

910 P.2d 427, 430

Petitioner's Petition named as Respondents Al

Bench as Fire Marshall and former Fire Chief of the RockvilleSpringdale Fire Protection District.

R.00001-00003.

Petitioner

claims for relief in its Complaint,
That the Court review the Fire Chief's decision
made on December 10, 1991, and take evidence on
the issues raised therein, to determine if the
water flow test conducted on November 1, 1991,
showed that the Petitioner's fire protection
system did not comply with Table No. A-III-A-1
[sic] of the Uniform Fire Code, and determine if
the test showed that the system was not adequate
for safe fire fighting capabilities, and
specifically whether hydrant No. 3 was a
dangerous hydrant. . . .
Id.
It is undisputed that at all times during the proceeding below,
and thereafter, Al Bench was not the Fire Chief, was not the Fire
Marshall, and was not affiliated as an official or member of the
Rockville-Springdale Fire District. The Fire District was not at any
time a party to the action below. Whether or not, as the Petitioner
argues, Al Bench, when he was the Chief, abused his discretion is of
no bearing in determining whether or not the Petitioner's claim is
moot.

Further, Table III of the Uniform Fire Code does not create a

right to ,f3 or more hydrants" for Petitioner, nor does it create a
right to fire protection in any person or entity.
Opening Brief, Exhibit "C").

(See Petitioner's

Whether or not Table III of the Uniform

Fire Code creates in the Petitioner a right to three or more fire
hydrants to protect its facility, and what the Petitioner did in an
attempt to bring his property into compliance with the Uniform Fire
Code, has no bearing on a mootness determination.
c:\ugt\westeUte\appeaI.rcp
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relief requested by the Petitioner cannot affect the rights of the
litigants, the case is moot. See Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp.,
P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995).

897

If, as the Petitioner apparently seeks,

the court below were to conclude that Al Bench as the Fire Chief
abused his discretion in interpreting the results of the November 1,
1991 flow test, and order Al Bench to approve the Indian Village
system as being safe for fire fighting capabilities and require Al
Bench to allow Terry West to reinstall the third fire hydrant and use
his 200 feet of abandoned line, such a ruling would have no effect.
Al Bench as a lay person and citizen of Springdale has no authority
to approve the November 1, 1991 version of the Indian Village Trading
Post fire hydrant system nor does he have authority to allow Terry
West to reactivate his hydrant No. 3 and utilize the 200 feet of
abandoned supply line.

Whatever the Court may ultimately order in

response to the Petition will in no way affect the right of the
litigants.

Id.

When an issue or case becomes moot, "fundamental

principles of procedure dictate that [courts] do not adjudicate moot
cases . . ." Stromquist

v.

Cokayne,

646 P.2d 746 (Utah 1982).

The case below is driven by only one thing, and that is the
Petitioner's insatiable drive for vindication.

A favorable result

for Petitioner would satisfy no other purpose. However, Utah courts
do not render advisory opinions and are reluctant to "waste their
limited resources simply to satisfy curiosity or a naked desire for
vindication".
JURISDICTION 2D

WRIGHT, MILLER AND COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

§ 3533; Reynolds

v. Reynolds,

78 P2d 1044, 1045 (Utah

1980).

c: \ugt\weststate\appeal. rep
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Petitionees claims are moot, and the court below erred in not
granting the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss below.
II.

INDIAN VILLAGE HAD OTHER PLAIN# ADEQUATE AND
SPEEDY REMEDIES,

To prevail on a Rule 65B petition, the petition must on its face
assert that no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy existed, and
that Petitioner must show ultimately that indeed this is so.
Jenkins

v.

Bishop,

589 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1970).

See

There is no

reference in the Petition that no other plain, adequate or speedy
remedy exists, nor did Petitioner show below, or has it shown in its
Brief, that no such remedy exists.

R.00001-00003.

The mere fact

that Petitioner failed to plead that no plain, adequate or speedy
remedy existed, is of itself sufficient to justify the denial of the
writ.

Jenkins,

at 772.

Petitioner argues in its Brief that since the Fifth District
Court, in another proceeding, involving other parties, suggested that
Petitioner could file a claim against the Fire Chief, "if he so
desires," which notably the Petitioner construes as a direction of
the court; and since counsel for the Fire District in a prior Fifth
District Court matter involving other parties, which matter is not
before this Court, and is not the subject of this appeal or otherwise
recorded, stated that the appropriate Rule 65B remedy might be
against the Fire Chief, see Petitioner's Brief, pp. 8-10, it follows
that the Petitioner had no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy.
Aside

from making no logical sense, Petitioner mistakenly

perceives that the Fifth District Court is in the business of
representing a litigant's interests and rendering a litigant legal
c:\ugt\weststate\appeal.rcp
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advice.

Likewise, Petitioner supposes that the statements made by

counsel for the Fire District are somehow either legal advice and
instruction to him or tantamount to legal precedence or orders of the
court. What the Court below and opposing counsel said to Petitioner
in another proceeding is neither the law of the case or legal
precedence.

Neither the court, nor the Fire District's counsel

represent Petitioner, nor does either have any obligation to advise
Petitioner of its legal rights or represent its interest.

The

Petitioner's reliance on these statements for purposes of authority
rebutting the Respondent's argument that other plain and adequate
remedies

existed,

is for

that

reason

and

otherwise

logically

misplaced.
Almost immediately upon receiving the findings based on then
Chief Bench's November 1, 1991 flow test, Petitioner sought and
received a hearing before a special blue chip appeals board convened
by the Fire District on January 30, 1992.

R. 00132.

That appeals

board upheld the findings and conclusions of then Chief Bench in
every respect. The disappointed Petitioner's appropriate response at
that point would have been an appeal of the appeals board's decision
to the State District Court.

Petitioner chose not to do so.

Likewise when Petitioner received adverse rulings in the Fifth
District in the other matters to which it has freely referred, it
could have appealed.

It chose not to do so.

Unfortunately, it is

not the call of Rule 65B to provide an avenue for appeal when an
appeal in the ordinary course has gone stale. See Anderson
296 P.2d at 283, 286 (Utah 1956); and Merrihew
Planning

v.

Salt

v. Baker,

Lake

County

and Zoning Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983).

c:\ugt\westsUte\appeal.rep
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As Petitioner could have appealed the January 3 0, 1992 Special
Appeals Board determination had it chosen to do so, and as Petitioner
could have appealed several other related adverse rulings of the
Fifth District, had it chosen to do so but instead allowed the
appropriate time period in which appeal to lapse, it had other plain,
adequate and speedy remedies and the Court erred in not dismissing
its Petition for an Extraordinary Writ.
III. RESPONDENT IS NOT AN ENTITY RECOGNIZED UNDER
RULE 65B(e)(2)(A) AND (B) AGAINST WHICH RELIEF
UNDER THE RULE IS APPROPRIATE.
Petitioner seeks relief in Petition under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure

65B(e)(2)(A)

and/or

(B) .

R.

00001-00003.

These

subsections of Rule 65B provide in relevant part that relief under
the

rule

may

be

appropriate

•• (A)

where

an

inferior

court,

administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has
exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an
inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has
failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust
or station;11.
factually
proceeding

Id.

The Respondent Al Bench was not, nor can it

be argued, at any time during
below, nor

the pendency

is he presently, an

inferior

of the

court, an

administrative agency, an officer exercising judicial functions, a
corporation, or a person who has a duty of office, trust or station.
At the time leading up to and following shortly after the November 1,
1991 flow test and the January 30, 1992 Special Appeals Board, the
Respondent Al Bench served as the Fire Chief and Fire Marshall for
the Rockville-Springdale Fire District.

c:\ugt\weststate\appeal.rep
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Petitioner

argues

in

its Brief that

the court

below had

authority to review the Respondent's decision below because the
Respondent's act was that "of an administrative agency" and because
the Petitioner "alleges that the administrative agency's Fire Chief
has abused his discretion."

Petitioner's Brief, p. 10.

Petitioner

does not provide any legal authority, indication in the pleadings, or
reference to the record that indicates that the Respondent indeed was
an administrative agency.

During the time of the November 1, 1991

flow test, the Respondent was, at best, a single representative of
the Rockville-Springdale Fire District acting under the authority of
that District.

He was not during that time frame an agency as

contemplated by the rules, nor did ultimate issues of compliance rest
with him. The Petitioner sought the review of Respondent's decision
by

the

Fire

received.

District

Special

Appeals

Board,

which

Petitioner

An individual member of a district or agency does not

constitute the represented agency as defined by Utah law. See
Salt

Lake Authority

v. Island

Ranching Co.,

Great

414 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah

1966).
There is no further argument that Al Bench was at any point in
time an inferior court, an officer exercising judicial functions, a
corporation or a person with a duty as a result of his office, trust
or station.
The Petitioner raises for the first time in its Brief the
concept that it may be entitled to relief under Rule 65B(e)(2)(C)
since, it argues, "the Fire Chief had a duty to approve the system,
and the cross-appellee had a right to use its system."

Petitioner's

Brief, p. 11. In its original Petition, at the hearing on the Motion
c:\ugt\weststate\appeal.rcp
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to Dismiss and finally at the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner never
made this argument nor sought relief under Rule 65B(e)(2)(C).
00001-00003.

R.

Neither does the Petitioner seek in its Petition an

order forcing the Respondent to "perform an act required by law as a
duty of his office, trust or station." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e) (2) (B) .
In its Petition, the Petitioner asks the court below to "review the
Fire Chief's decision made on December 10, 1991 . . . and determine
if the tests showed that the system was not adequate for safe fire
fighting capabilities. . ."

R. 00001-00003.

It was this Petition

upon which Petitioner sought extraordinary relief under Rule 65B, and
upon which the Motion to Dismiss was based, not the arguments in
Petitioner's Brief otherwise unsupported by the record below.
As the Respondent is not an inferior court, administrative
agency, officer exercising judicial functions, a corporation or
person of office, trust or station, the court below erred in not
dismissing the Petition.
IV.

THE REVIEW SOUGHT BY PETITIONER IS NOT WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF RULE 65B.

In its Brief, Petitioner argues that since then Chief Bench's
November 1, 1991 flow test "showed that the fire hydrant system water
flowed 3,210 GPM, 460 GPM more than what Table III-A of the U.F.C.
requires, and that since Petitioner's Rule 65B Petition asked the
Court to review the Fire Chief's decision which was based on the test
results found in Bench's letter dated December 10, 1991, that the
court below did not err in denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss."
Petitioner's Brief, pp.12-13.
utter non sequitur.
c:\ugt\wcststotc\appcal.rep
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sought in its Petition is a review of the Respondent's decision based
on the November 1, 1991 flow test and a determination of whether or
not, "the tests showed that the system was not adequate for safe fire
fighting capabilities, and specifically whether hydrant No. 3 was a
dangerous hydrant."

R. 00001-00003.

It is this relief articulated

by the Petitioner in its Petition which is not sanctionable under
Rule 65B.

"Where the responsibility for basic policy decisions has

been committed to one of the branches of our tri-partite system of
government, the courts have refrained from sitting in judgment of the
propriety of those decisions." Little
Services,

v. Utah State

667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983); Keegan

P.2d 618 (Utah 1995).

v.

Div.

State

of

Family

of Utah,

896

While Petitioner would like the Court to

become in essence a super fire chief and state that Respondent made
the wrong decision, and that in fact, Petitioner's fire hydrant
system is safe for fire fighting purposes, this form of relief is
beyond that contemplated by Rule 65B. The findings of fact gathered
by Respondent in its flow test and as reviewed and affirmed by the
Special Appeals Board on January 30, 1992, are to be "accorded
substantial

deference and will

not

be overturned

if based on

substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is
permissible."

See

Hurley

v.

Board

P.2d 524, 526-527 (Utah 1988).

of

Review

of

Indus.

Comm'n,

767

When an appropriate petition is

filed, the court will only review the record below to determine
whether an agency, a judicial officer, or inferior tribunal abused
its discretion, or whether the petitioner was otherwise denied due
process.

The courts are not to review and reverse the agency's,

inferior tribunal, or judicial officer's decision. Proceeding based
e:\ugt\wcststatc\appcAl.rep
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on the relief sought in the Petition in this case is anathema to the
tri-partite system and the deference afforded inferior tribunals,
administrative agencies, judicial officers, corporations and persons
of office, trust or station by the reviewing court.

The court below

therefore erred in not dismissing the Petition on this basis alone.
The Petitioner raises for the first time in its Brief the
concept that Section 5 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution vests
general appellate jurisdiction in the District Court, impliedly over
the Respondent's conduct below. Petitioner's Response Brief, p. 13.
Again, Petitioner did not seek a review in the District Court
pursuant to Section 5 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution in its
Petition nor was this in any way raised in or even a part of the
court proceedings below.

Moreover, Article VIII Section 5 provides

that "the district court shall have original jurisdiction in all
matters except as limited by this Constitution or by statute, and
power to issue all extraordinary writs.

The district court shall

have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute."

This general

grant of Section 5 of Article VIII does not obviate the requirements
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and in particular Rule 65B nor does it obviate the
requirement that an appeal be sought in a timely manner as provided
in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or otherwise
applicable administrative act.

in the

It is naive for Petitioner to argue

that the Utah Constitution provides for a right of appeal unfettered
by any time limitation, procedural requirement or any other sort of
limitation provided otherwise in statute, rule of procedure, or
administrative regulation.
c:\ugt\weststAte\appeal.rep
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and as more fully discussed in
Respondent's

Cross-Appellant's

Brief,

Respondent

respectfully

requests that this Court find that the Fifth District Court erred in
denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and enter an order of
dismissal.
DATED this

^ [

day of June, 1996.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY

BENSON L. HATHAT)
Attorneys for
Respondent/Appellee
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